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INTRODUCTION 
  
On May 1, 2012, President Obama announced that U.S. forces 
would continue their phased withdrawal from Afghanistan such that 
by the end of 2014, Afghan security forces will have full responsibility 
for their country’s security.1  Of particular note, the President’s speech 
was directed solely at an American audience with very little attention 
paid to either Afghan sentiment or the Afghan people’s needs.  The 
unidirectional nature of the President’s focus was inadvertently 
evidenced when, on Afghan soil, he closed the speech by stating: 
                                               
* Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of 
Law.  The author would like to dedicate this piece to his darling Melanie. 
1 See Mark Landler, Obama Signs Pact in Kabul, Turning Page in Afghan War, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/world/ 
asia/obama-lands-in-kabul-on-unannounced-
visit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also David E. Sanger, Charting Obama’s 
Journey to a Shift on Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/us/obamas-journey-to-reshape-
afghanistan-war.html?hp.    
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“May God bless our troops and may God bless the United States of 
America.”2  The President’s words did not evidence any 
acknowledgement that an expression of American solicitude for 
Afghan well-being might equally be in the American people’s 
interests.  Indeed, throughout the War on Terror, American policy 
objectives have been hamstrung by an almost exclusive focus on 
domestic American public opinion and a complete failure to address 
the international community’s perception of U.S policies.3  The 
international community’s suspicions as to American good faith was 
exacerbated by the February 2012 accidental incineration of Korans at 
the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram, Afghanistan4 and the March 2012 
killing of sixteen Afghan civilians, allegedly by U.S. Army Sergeant 
Robert Bales.5 
Both the President’s May 1, 2012 speech and the preceding 
tragic events highlight the precarious position of U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan.  Though U.S. forces are necessary to protect President 
Hamid Karzai’s government from the Taliban insurgency, the United 
States’ continued presence in the country has led to widespread anger 
by Afghans and members of the global community who perceive that 
U.S. forces show insufficient concern for civilian welfare.6  On May 18, 
                                               
2 Address to the Nation on Military Operations in Afghanistan from Bagram 
Air Base, Afghanistan, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 336 (May 2, 2012). 
3 See Dr. Steven Kull, Dir., Program on Int’l Policy Attitudes (PIPA), and 
Editor, WorldPublicOpinion.org, America's Image in the World, Address 
Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight (Mar. 6, 2007) (transcript 
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_ 
on_countriesregions_bt/326.php?nid=&id=&pnt=326).  
4 See Babrak Miakhel, Six Dead in Afghanistan Koran Burning Protests, BBC 
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2012, 10:39 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
17123464. 
5 See James Dao, U.S. Identifies Army Sergeant in Killing of 16 in Afghanistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/world/ 
asia/afghan-shooting-suspect-identified-as-army-staff-sgt-robert-
bales.html?pagewanted=all. 
6 See Ahmad Nadem & Ahmad Haroon, Afghans Urge U.S. Exit After Killings; 
U.S. Says Timetable Unchanged, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/12/us-afghanistan-civilians-
idUSBRE82A02V20120312. 
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2012, the newly elected French President, Francois Hollande, 
informed President Obama that France would be withdrawing the 
majority of its 3,400 forces stationed in Afghanistan by the year’s end.7  
The French withdrawal and reluctance by other NATO allies to 
contribute to the Afghan anti-insurgency campaign is largely 
attributable to the international community’s view that U.S. policy is 
based on domestic politics alone with insufficient solicitude shown 
for either Afghan civilian well-being or the concerns of world public 
opinion.8  These perceptions will make it more difficult for the Obama 
administration and its successor to effectively disengage from the 
Middle East and South Asia, share the costs of international security 
with its allies, and address long-neglected domestic problems. 9 
The United States’ national interest has traditionally been 
international stability, free markets, and democratization.  During 
much of the twentieth century, the United States was the 
indispensable nation that intervened at critical moments to assure the 
modern, increasingly democratic, and globalized world.  Although 
these priorities remain, the United States has a further interest in 
seeing a shift in the global paradigm from a unipolar world, in which 
it bears nearly all the diplomatic and military costs of ensuring 
continued globalization, to a multi-polar world, in which it is, if 
anything, first among equals.10  This process, however, is crippled by 
the United States’ continued military presence in both South Asia and 
                                               
7 Dan Robinson, Hollande Meets Obama, Reaffirms Early Afghanistan 
Withdrawal, VOICE OF AMERICA (May 18, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/ 
content/article/727271.html.  
8 See Sanger, supra note 1; see also Tom Engelhardt, Predator Drone Nation, THE 
NATION (May 14, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/167868/ 
predator-drone-nation.  
9 See Jane Kelly, Australian Ambassador Lauds U.S. Strategic Shift, UVA TODAY 
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/newsRelease. 
php?id=17888; see also James Kitfield, Geopolitical Shift: Old Europe to New 
Asia?, NAT’L J. NAT’L SEC. EXPERTS BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010, 10:19 AM), 
http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/11/geopolitical-shift-old-
europe.php. 
10 See DAVID E. SANGER, THE INHERITANCE: THE WORLD OBAMA CONFRONTS 
AND THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN POWER p. 471 (Three Rivers Press 2009). 
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the Middle East and the United States’ excessive focus on the War on 
Terror.11  Although the United States has sincerely sought to engender 
both democracy and pluralism in these regions, spending billions of 
dollars to develop civilian infrastructure in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
and never seeking to acquire territory for itself, its perceived rejection 
of world public opinion and international legal norms has harmed 
both its international reputation and its ability to “turn the page” and 
effectively disengage.12  President Abraham Lincoln engaged in a civil 
war with a wholly different purpose and context from today’s 
circumstances.  However, Lincoln did have similar hurdles to 
overcome, including massive military resistance and opposition to his 
goal of preserving the Union.  Although his handling of the Civil War 
was not without error or controversy, there are lessons to be learned 
from Lincoln in terms of both his actions and his mistakes, given to us 
in hindsight.  As set forth below, U.S. policy makers can look to 
Lincoln’s legacy to improve its image - and thus its credibility - on the 
international scene.  
 
I.  THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 
 The Al Qaeda terrorist organization, based at the time in 
Afghanistan, tragically attacked United States civilian infrastructure 
on September 11, 2001.  Nineteen Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four 
passenger jets, crashed two of them into the twin towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Arlington, 
Virginia and a fourth into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after 
                                               
11 See Anne Applebaum, The Worst Mistake America Made After 9/11: How 
Focusing Too Much on the War on Terror Undermined Our Economy and Global 
Power, SLATE (Sept. 4, 2011, 7:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/09/the_worst_mistake_america_made_
after_911.html.    
12  David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives 
/2011/sep/29/after-september-11-what-we-still-dont-know/ 
?pagination=false.  
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passengers attempted to take control before the plane could reach the 
terrorists’ intended target in Washington, D.C.  The 9/11 attacks led 
to the killing of nearly 3,000 civilians on American soil13 and caused 
trillions of dollars in damage to the United States economy.14  Indeed, 
in the first days after the terrorist attacks, the perception was that up 
many more innocent civilians had been killed in the attacks than was 
actually the case.15 
 In the immediate aftermath, the international community 
rallied around the United States and its people.  Of note, the United 
Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368 that 
unequivocally condemned the terrorist attacks and expressed the 
Security Council’s readiness “to take all necessary steps to respond to 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of 
terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of 
the United Nations.”16  Perhaps the world’s most prestigious non-
English language newspaper, the French daily “Le Monde” published 
a September 12, 2001 cover article titled “Nous sommes tous 
Américains” in  support of the American people.17  Indeed, public 
manifestations of sympathy with the American people arose 
immediately and spontaneously not only in industrialized and 
                                               
13 9/11 Investigation (PENTTBOM), FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/9-11-investigation  (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
14 See Shan Carter & Amanda Cox, One 9/11 Talley: $3.3 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-
11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html?_r=0.  
15 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 292 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
16 S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); see also Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns, ‘In Strongest Terms,’ 
Terrorist Attacks on United States, U.N. Press Release SC/7143 (Sept. 12, 
2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ 
SC7143.doc.htm. 
17 See Jean-Marie Colombani, Nous Sommes Tous Américains [We are all 
Americans], LE MONDE, May 23, 2007, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/ 
article/2007/05/23/nous-sommes-tous-americains_913706_3232.html (Fr.).   
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mature democracies, but also in Russia, China, Iran, Kuwait and 
India.18 
With strong evidence that Al Qaeda was responsible, 
President George W. Bush, on September 20, 2001, demanded the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan turn over Al Qaeda leaders, 
including its head, Osama bin Laden, to avoid a United States 
invasion of Afghanistan.19  President Bush’s ultimatum was issued 
based on Congress’ September 14, 2001 Authorization for Military 
Force against Terrorists that was signed into law by President Bush on 
September 18, 2001.  The invasion of Afghanistan, which commenced 
on October 7, 2001 and followed the Taliban’s refusal to turn bin 
Laden directly over to the United States,20 was most likely legal under 
international law as an act of self-defense authorized by Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter.21 
 
II.  THE AFGHANISTAN WAR 
 
 With the help of the Northern Alliance, the United States 
easily defeated the Taliban government of Mullah Omar and created 
                                               
18 See Haley Sweetland Edwards, We Are All Americans: The World’s Response 
to 9/11, MENTAL_FLOSS (Sept. 9, 2011, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/99665.  
19 See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. 
Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001); see also Bush Delivers Ultimatum, CNN (Sept. 20, 
2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/world/ret.afghan.bush_1_senior-
taliban-official-terrorist-ringleader-osama-bin-mullah-mohammed-
omar?_s=PM:asiapcf. 
20 See Taliban Won’t Turn Over Bin Laden, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/11/world/main310852.shtml. 
21 See U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
charter/chapter7.shtml; see also Ben Smith & Arabella Thorp, The Legal Basis 
for the Invasion of Afghanistan (House of Commons Library Standard Note 
SN/IA/5340, Feb. 26, 2010), available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN05340.pdf.  
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an Afghan Interim Authority, which in turn led to the establishment 
of a government under the Presidency of Hamid Karzai.22  
 Since the invasion and subsequent transfer of power to the 
Karzai Government, the United States and its NATO allies shifted 
focus and relocated troops to Iraq.  This arguably facilitated the 
Taliban’s ability to reconstitute itself and launch a vicious war against 
both NATO and Afghan forces for control of the country.  
 The Obama administration maintains that this deliberate move 
away from Afghanistan was a mistake, both because it was the base of 
Al-Qaeda’s operations and because of the country’s proximity to 
Pakistan.23  While the troop surge of 2010 likely stabilized the 
predicament of the Karzai government, it has been accompanied by 
increased wariness about the rise in civilian casualties.  The 
effectiveness of United States forces in Afghanistan is limited by the 
perception they operate at the expense of the Afghan people’s well-
being and safety.24  This concern is exacerbated by the Obama 
administration’s expanded use of Predator Drones within the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to kill suspected terrorists, 
regardless of the effects of such policies on innocent lives.  As 
Professor Samuel Vincent Jones writes: 
The high number of civilian casualties has 
severely undermined support for U.S. 
counterinsurgency programs and the Afghan 
government itself.  Protection of the Afghan civilian 
populace is critically necessary to regaining their active 
and continued support for the Afghan government, 
                                               
22  See Britannica.com, Hamid Karzai, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/761104/Hamid-Karzai (last 
vistied Dec. 2, 2013). 
23 Sanger, supra note 1; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND 
CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. Relations with Afghanistan (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm. 
24 See Laura King, U.S.-Afghan Divide Seen in Perceptions of Village Massacre, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/17/world/ 
la-fg-afghanistan-killings-20120318.   
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and it is essential to depriving the Taliban of its 
authority and appeal.25 
Reversing the continued erosion of support among Afghans 
for the Karzai government has proved elusive, largely due to the 
Karzai government’s inability to protect the Afghan people from 
either Taliban insurgents or U.S. forces. 
 
III.  USE OF GUANTANAMO BAY AS A DETENTION FACILITY 
 
  During the Afghanistan invasion, U.S. forces took custody of 
hundreds of individuals on Afghan soil and transferred many of these 
detainees to the Camp X-Ray (and subsequently Camp Delta) 
detention facility situated within the United States’ Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Station in Cuba.26  The reason why “GITMO” was chosen as the 
detention facility is largely because the Bush administration believed 
prisoners held on Cuban soil would not have habeas corpus rights 
under the United States Constitution to challenge the legality of their 
detention as enemy combatants in U.S. federal court.  These 
controversial detentions engendered further international enmity 
when the Bush administration asserted the detainees, as “enemy 
combatants,” need not be afforded the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions because such protections only apply to uniformed 
soldiers.27 
                                               
25 Samuel Vincent Jones, The Ethics of Letting Civilians Die in Afghanistan: The 
False Dichotomy Between Hobbesian and Kantian Rescue Paradigms, 59 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 899, 901-02 (2010). 
26 See Briannica.com, Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp,  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1503067/Guantanmo-Bay-
detention-camp (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). 
27 Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 
"Extraordinary Rendition" Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6.  
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 The detentions were further delegitimized by allegations of 
systematic torture against detainees by U.S. forces.28  Indeed, a leaked 
International Committee of the Red Cross report of July 2004 cited the 
United States for forcing prisoners to suffer “humiliating acts, solitary 
confinement, temperature extremes, [and] use of forced positions.”29  
Many released prisoners complained of having suffered beatings, 
sleep deprivation, prolonged constraint in uncomfortable positions, 
prolonged hooding, sexual and cultural humiliation, and other 
physical and psychological mistreatment during their detention.30 
A May 2007 United Nations Human Rights Council Report 
stated the United States violated international law, particularly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and disputed the 
Bush Administration’s authority to try Guantanamo Bay prisoners as 
enemy combatants in military tribunals. As stated by the International 
Committee for the Red Cross, the body charged with monitoring 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions: 
 
Every person in enemy hands must have some status 
under international law: he is either a prisoner of war 
and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a 
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a 
member of the medical personnel of the armed forces 
who is covered by the First Convention. There is no 
intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be 
outside the law.31  
 
                                               
28 Giles Tremlett, Spanish Court Opens Investigation of Guantánamo Torture 
Allegations, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2009/apr/29/spain-court-guantanamo-detainees-torture.  
29 Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/ 
30gitmo.html.  
30 Id. 
31 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
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Notwithstanding the United States Government’s claims to the 
contrary, the Supreme Court, in three cases decided on June 28, 2004, 
determined the Guantanamo Bay detainees should have access to 
federal courts.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that an American 
citizen apprehended in Afghanistan and held as an enemy combatant 
must be accorded due process and a meaningful factual hearing as to 
his enemy combatant status.32  In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,33 although the 
Court held the lower court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s 
habeas corpus petition, it signaled the government has no authority to 
detain an American citizen arrested on United States soil as an enemy 
combatant.34  Finally, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that those being 
detained in Guantanamo Bay can have their habeas corpus petitions 
heard in United States federal courts.35  These decisions, the Supreme 
Court’s first rulings about the government’s actions in the war on 
terrorism since the 9/11 attacks, were a political intervention by the 
judicial branch intended to remediate concerns the Bush 
Administration acted outside the requirements of both American and 
international jurisprudence.36  Four years later, in Boumediene v. 
Bush,37 the Court concluded the United States’ denial of habeas corpus 
rights to non-citizens held as enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay 
violated the Constitution’s suspension clause because Congress had 
not suspended this right under its  Article 1 authority. 
Further undermining support for Bush’s War on Terror was 
the administration’s use of “enhanced interrogation,” or torture, to 
obtain probative information needed to both apprehend existing 
terrorists and prevent further terrorist attacks.38  Merits aside, 
                                               
32 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004). 
33 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).  
34 Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for 
Immigrants Facing Deportation, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 14 (2005). 
35 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
36 Cole, supra note 12; Linda Greenhouse, Goodbye Gitmo, OPINIONATOR (May 
16, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/ 
goodbye-to-gitmo/?hp.    
37 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).  
38 See generally JOSE A. RODRIGUEZ , JR. WITH BILL HARLOW, HARD MEASURES: 
HOW AGGRESSIVE CIA ACTIONS AFTER 9/11 SAVED AMERICAN LIVES 263 
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American government officials failed to anticipate domestic and 
international resistance to its interrogation methods.39  
Recognizing the worldwide negative reaction to continued use 
of Guantanamo Bay as a detention facility for alleged enemy 
combatants, President Obama sought to close the facility.  Attorney 
General Eric Holder announced that the accused co-conspirators of 
the terrorist attacks would be tried in civilian federal district court, 
while other alleged offenders would be tried by military commission.  
In the face of strong domestic opposition to both proposals, the 
Obama administration has since backtracked.40  Although this might 
have been necessitated by domestic politics, it can be argued the 
decision has worsened the United States' standing within the 
international community, which sees the use of military justice as 
both illegitimate and predetermined.41 
 
IV. THE IRAQI INVASION AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE IRAQI 
OCCUPATION 
 
 Shortly after the Iraq occupation, and notwithstanding the fact 
that neither the United States nor its allies had captured any senior 
members of Al Qaeda, the Bush administration shifted its focus to 
                                                                                                               
(Threshold Editions 2012) (discussing enhanced interrogation techniques in 
the wake of the attacks on 9/11); http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/ 
world/10tapes.html?_r=0 
39 See 9/11 and the War on Terror: Polls Show What People Think 10 Years Later, 
WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/ 
2011/09/911-and-the-war-on-terror-polls-show-what-people-really-believe-
10-years-later.html. 
40 Evan Perez, U.S. Reverses on 9/11 Trials, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703806304576242763782267
924.html.  
41 Sara Sorcher, Insiders: Military Justice Capable of Fair Trial for Suspect in of 
Afghan Shooting, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Mar. 27, 2012, available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-military-justice-
system-capable-of-fair-trial-for-suspect-of-afghan-shooting-20120326. 
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“regime change” in Iraq, defined as the forcible removal of the 
murderous totalitarian regime of  then-President Saddam Hussein.42 
 The Bush Administration’s reasons for the invasion were 
based on a claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and 
was, therefore, in violation of existing United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions.43  In the process, President Bush and his 
administration threatened the United Nations Security Council to 
prove its relevance by authorizing the use of force against Iraq, all the 
while letting it be known the United States was prepared to use 
military force without United Nations approval to do so.44  This 
position was contrary to international law, as Iraq posed no direct 
threat to the United States and, therefore, did not provide the United 
States with authority to undertake a unilateral invasion of Iraq based 
on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.45  Indeed, the United 
States, after going to the United Nations Security Council to request 
authorization to invade Iraq on the grounds of Iraq’s failure to disarm 
itself of Weapons of Mass Destruction, chose to bypass the 
intergovernmental body when it became clear that its request for such 
authority would be voted down by both the Security’s Council’s 
Permanent Members and the body as a whole after the United 
Nations Chief Weapons Inspector, Hans Blix, presented the Council 
with a February 14, 2003 report contradicting many United States' 
claims.46  Indeed, when the United States invasion of Iraq began on 
                                               
42 Joseph Cirincione, Origins of Regime Change in Iraq, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Mar. 19, 2003),  
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 2003/03/19/origins-of-regime-
change-in-iraq/4pr. 
43 Seymour M. Hersh, Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld Has His Own 
Special Sources. Are They Reliable?, THE NEW YORKER, May 12, 2003, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact. 
44 Agence France Presse, Bush Threatened Nations That Did Not Back Iraq War: 
Report, GOOGLE NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), http://afp.google.com/article/ 
ALeqM5g3bV2LfRcSgbK7btDtgfbe2NGt8Q (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
45 Rachel S. Taylor, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, 
WORLD PRESS REVIEW, http://worldpress.org/specials/iraq/ (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2013). 
46 Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Briefing of the Security 
Council, 14 February 2003: An Update on Inspections, UNITED NATIONS 
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March 19, 2003, nearly the entire international political community 
was opposed to the endeavor.47  The United States' strongest ally in 
the invasion, the United Kingdom, did pursue a policy of strategic 
cooperation with the United States, but U.K. public opinion was 
heavily lopsided against United States policy, with a large majority of 
Britons opposed to the war from the start.  A January 2007 BBC World 
Service Poll evidenced that seventy three percent of the world’s 
population in twenty five countries disapproved of U.S. policy in Iraq. 
Lack of global public support greatly harmed the ability of the 
United States to democratize Iraq in a peaceful manner, and the 
United States was seen by key elements of Iraqi society as an invader 
and an occupier as opposed to a liberating force.48  Moreover, 
mistakes made by the United States-led Coalition Provisional 
Authority that eventually handed over control of Iraq to the Iraqi 
government, led to both anarchy and communal violence throughout 
the country that was propitiated by insufficient U.S. occupation 
forces.49  The consequences of these mistakes, arguably violations of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, continue to persist as Iraq remains 
prone to high levels of communal violence.50 
 
                                                                                                               
MONITORING, VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (Feb. 14, 2003), 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_ 
council_briefings.asp#6; see also Ronan Bennett, Ten Days to War, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/ 
08/iraq.unitednations; Hans Blix's Briefing to the Security Council, THE 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/ 
feb/14/iraq.unitednations1. 
47 See Britannica.com, Iraq War, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/870845/Iraq-War (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2013). 
48 Cesar G. Soriano & Steven Komarow, Poll: Iraqis Out of Patience, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 30, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-
04-28-poll-cover_x.htm.   
49 Anthony H. Cordesman, American Strategic, Tactical, and Other Mistakes in 
Iraq: A Litany of Errors, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD (Apr. 19, 2006), 
available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060419_iraqlitany.pdf.   
50 UN: Attacks Killed 613 Civilians in Iraq in January-March 2012, TREND (Apr. 
10, 2012), http://en.trend.az/regions/met/iraq/2012895.html. 
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V.  AMERICAN ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN IRAQ 
 
The United States did accomplish a great deal in Iraq.  It 
removed the murderous Ba’athist Government of President Saddam 
Hussein from power.  It also commenced a process of democratization 
that could, for the first time, see a genuine democracy emerge in an 
area that was once the Abbasid Caliphate’s capital.51  The Arab Spring 
of 2011 manifested that democratization does have great resonance 
within the Arab world, despite the flawed predictions of the war’s 
strongest proponents.52  To the Bush administration’s credit, the 
United States disregarded the bipartisan Iraq Study Group’s 
recommendation and implemented a “surge” of American forces to 
provide much-needed protection to Iraqis against insurgents in both 
Baghdad and Al-Anbar province in 2007.53  It is important to 
recognize these actions as achievements and also as tacit recognition 
that mistakes were made.  Unfortunately, they may have been too 
little too late.  The Administration’s unilateral and extra-legal 
invasion alienated world public opinion and will most likely prevent 
the international community and Iraqi civil society from closer 
rapprochement with the United States for the foreseeable future.  
Indeed, by most accounts, the current Iraqi Government of Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s closest bilateral relationship is with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, a country that is vehemently opposed to U.S. 
interests.54 
                                               
51 David Frum, Will Iraq’s Democracy Vindicate Bush?, CNN OPINION (Mar. 8, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-08/opinion/frum.iraq.election_ 
1_polling-stations-elections-voting-procedure?_s=PM:OPINION. 
52 Sarina A. Beges, Stanford Scholars Reflect on Arab Spring, STANFORD NEWS 
SERVICE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/january/ 
arab-spring-anniversary-012512.html. 
53 Bob Woodward, Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just the Surge, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/09/07/AR2008090701847.html. 
54 David S. Cloud, As U.S. Prepares to Leave Iraq, Iran's Shadow Looms Large, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011,  http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/14/ 
world/la-fg-1114-us-iran-20111114.   
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Although Iraq may, in time, turn into a functioning and 
prosperous democracy, it must be recognized that between March 
2003 and July 2007, violence stemming from United States combat 
operations in Iraq caused the death of an estimated 125,000 to 600,000 
Iraqi civilians.55  Approximately 2.7 million Iraqis have been 
internally displaced by violence that followed the U.S. 
invasion and occupation and a further 1.7 million Iraqis 
have fled the conflict in Iraq, with the majority taking 
refuge in Syria and Jordan, and lesser numbers to Egypt, 
Lebanon, Iran, and Turkey.56 In all,  well over 4 million Iraqis 
sought refuge in other Middle Eastern countries or were internally 
displaced.57  These figures are either unknown or irrelevant to United 
States political culture, which instead focuses almost exclusively on 
American casualties in considering the War’s legitimacy.  The relative 
American disregard for Iraqi civilian suffering has both delegitimized 
its claim to have been acting in the Iraqi people’s best interest and 
placed it at odds with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions.  This, as set forth more fully below, distinguishes 
American actions in Iraq from its actions during the Civil War. 
 
VI.  PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE PLANNED WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
 The Obama administration has sought to reengage with the 
international community to engender assistance with a planned 
disengagement from the Middle East and South Asia.  Both domestic 
and international policies, however, have made a reversal of public 
                                               
55 See Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: 
Cluster Sample Survey, 364 THE LANCET 1857 (Nov. 2004), available at 
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/politics/bib/lancet.pdf; see also 
Jones, supra note 25, at 900.  See also http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ 
56 THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, 2013 UNHCR COUNTRY OPERATIONS PROFILE – 
IRAQ, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2013). 
57 Jones, supra note 25, at 900 and   
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opinion difficult to attain.  At home, political constraints have 
prevented the Administration from both closing the detention facility 
at Guantanamo Bay and from trying suspected terrorists in United 
States civilian courts.58  Overseas, the United States has increased its 
use of Predator Drones to kill suspected terrorists, notwithstanding 
the consequent deaths of South Asian civilians and a further 
perception the United States is a party to indiscriminate killings.59  
The use of Drones in warfare is problematic under international law. 
Professor Heinz Klug writes: 
While “collateral damage” is acknowledged as an 
inevitable consequence of military action, a unique 
feature of “smart” weapons, and particularly the 
Predator UAV, is that the individual target is identified 
and hit in real time with a degree of certainty rare in 
the history of modern warfare. Outside of a theater of 
combat—defined by time and place—the targeting of 
individuals for elimination, particularly if they are not 
openly armed or engaged in a certain level of hostilities 
at the time, without an attempt to apprehend them or 
to give them a chance to surrender, could be 
considered murder under the Geneva Conventions.60 
Most recently, the United States has been involved in “regime 
change” in Libya, and has mooted an invasion of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, largely at the Israeli government of Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu and the United States pro-Israel lobby’s behest.61  The 
                                               
58 Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama Clears Way for Guantánamo Trials, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/ 
americas/08guantanamo.html.   
59 Jane Mayer, Jane Mayer: Predator Versus International Law, THE NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 29, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/jane-
mayer-predator-versus-international-law.html.  
60 Heinz Klug, The Rule of Law, War, or Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 365, 381-82 
(2003).   
61 Steve Kingstone, Netanyahu Talks Tough in Obama Iran Meeting, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 6, 2012, 2:23 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
17260083; Dana Milbank, AIPAC Beats the Drums of War, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/aipac-beats-the-drums-
of-war/2012/03/05/gIQASVMZtR_story.html.   
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American policy of forcing the Islamic Republic to completely 
renounce its nuclear program is delegitimized by the fate of the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya, which previously gave up its nuclear 
weapons program, and by the relatively restrained United States 
policy towards Pakistan and North Korea, both of which possess 
substantial nuclear weapon arsenals.62  All of this must be seen 
through the prism of the world following the financial crisis, in which 
much of the international community blames the United States 
government’s loose regulatory paradigm for plunging the world into 
a near-depression and for acting as a predatory, as opposed to 
benevolent, hegemon that is incapable of addressing its pronounced 
domestic problems.  In short, the United States has ceased to be the 
focus of global aspirations, well symbolized in the early 1990s, when 
Filipino demonstrators carried signs reading “Yankee Go Home — 
and take me with you.”63 
Where did things go wrong? What caused the United States to 
go from the leading liberal democracy whose hard and soft power 
enabled it to lead the Western world in its confrontation with the Axis 
Powers, Soviet Communism and beyond, to a country viewed 
globally with skepticism and distrust?  
 
VII.  AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Many on the political right justifiably posit that much of this 
skepticism is nothing more than parochial anti-Americanism, brought 
about by worldwide envy at American wealth and power.  Indeed, 
many conservatives,  including the neoconservative scholar Robert 
Kagan, claim this anti-Americanism is a concomitant of the United 
                                               
62 Fredrik Dahl, Analysis: Libya Conflict May Strengthen Iran Nuclear Defiance, 
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
03/24/us-iran-libya-nuclear-idUSTRE72N4WH20110324. 
63 Edwin Kiester, Jr. & Sally Valente Kiester, Yankee Go Home — And Take Me 
With You!, SMITHSONIAN MAG., May 1999, available at 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/philips-abstract.html. 
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States being the only first-world nation that uses hard or military 
power to police the international system.64  This is a position worthy 
of further discussion and elaboration beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
VIII. PROBLEMS RELATED TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 
 
In reality, there is more at work here than mere parochial 
envy. The problem stems from an almost pathological obsession with 
domestic politics in formulating U.S foreign policy, in conjunction 
with the United States being confronted, for the first time, with a form 
of asymmetric warfare against terrorist adversaries, who profit from 
and take shelter in failed states such as Afghanistan, portions of 
Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and beyond.  As a result, the U.S.’s success 
in this endeavor is not only based on its military successes, but on 
engendering international cooperation and good will in an effort to 
both isolate and defeat anti-civilizational terrorist networks and their 
allies.  This, of course, requires the United States to prevent these 
organizations from replenishing their membership via recruitment.  
This was well-enunciated by former Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, who, in an internal October 16, 2003 memorandum to 
General Richard Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith, wrote the 
following: 
Today, we lack metrics to know if we are 
winning or losing the global war on terror.  Are we 
capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more 
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical 
clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against 
us? 
Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated 
plan to stop the next generation of terrorists?  The US is 
putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, 
                                               
64 Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL’Y REV. (June 2002), available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7107.  
WAR ON TERROR – LESSONS FROM LINCOLN    31 
  
but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to 
stop terrorists.  The cost-benefit ratio is against us!  Our 
cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.65 
 The United States, however, has approached the “War on 
Terror” solely through the prism of domestic politics and has 
needlessly alienated large segments of the international community 
by its failure to address the concerns of global public opinion.  Its 
decision to both threaten and then bypass the United Nations Security 
Council, its use of Camp X-Ray and Guantanamo Bay to detain 
enemy combatants, its use of enhanced interrogation measures, 
“rendition” and Predator Drones66 are all actions that have had 
significant domestic support, but which have alienated key 
international constituencies.  A year 2010 University of Maryland Poll 
of Arab public opinion, conducted by Zogby International, evidences 
continued antipathy towards the U.S.67 
 To borrow the title of the Russian novelist Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s nineteenth century novel, “What is to be done?”  
Certainly the 9/11 terrorist attacks were shockingly destructive to 
both American life and property.  Moreover, it is unequivocally true 
that Al-Qaeda would certainly have attacked the United States again 
were the United States not to have actively disrupted and destroyed 
this anti-civilizational international terror network.  Should the 
violation of international human rights and warfare norms 
delegitimize an undertaking that was designed solely to protect the 
                                               
65 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Def., to Gen. Richard 
Myers et al. (Oct. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-
memo.htm.  
66 Both of which are proscribed by the United Nations Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
and signed by President Reagan on April 18, 1988 and ratified by the United 
States Senate on October 27, 1990.  See Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (June 
26, 1987). 
67 Eyder Peralta, New Poll Finds U.S. Viewed Less Favorably in Arab World, NPR 
(Jul. 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/07/ 
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United States and the international system from terror networks like 
Al-Qaeda?  After all, aren’t the first victims of Islamic extremists 
innocent women, girls and moderate Muslims who seek to integrate 
their countries within the international system?  And didn’t Lincoln 
countenance far worse during the American Civil War in order to 
fulfill the far more pressing imperative of preserving the Union?   
 
IX.  LESSONS FROM LINCOLN 
 
 Lincoln’s conduct as Commander-in-Chief was premised on 
the sole objective of preserving the Union.68  Indeed, during the Civil 
War, the “‘predominant purpose’ of all federal operations was the 
political goal of reestablishing U.S. government authority over the 
states that had seceded from the Union.”69  With that goal in place, the 
Lincoln administration countenanced the use of harsh and illegal 
measures in the process of defeating the Confederacy.  This included 
President Lincoln’s implementation of an illegal suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus notwithstanding Chief Justice Taney’s opinion 
in Ex Parte Merryman, which confirmed the text of the United States 
Constitution Article I’s Suspension Clause and held the President has 
no authority to unilaterally suspend habeas corpus rights.70  In total, 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ resulted in 38,000 civilians being 
arrested and held by the military without trial and judicial review.71  
Among those arrested were prominent members of American society, 
                                               
68 See BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, LINCOLN ON TRIAL: SOUTHERN CIVILIANS AND 
THE LAW OF WAR  9 (The University Press of Kentucky 2010); see also Robert 
Fabrikant, Lincoln, Emancipation, and “Military Necessity”: Review of Burrus M. 
Carnahan’s Act of Justice, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and the Law of 
War, 52 HOW. L.J. 375, 377 (2009). 
69 Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and 
Limits of the Principle of the Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 222 (1998). 
70 Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 No. 6 CRIM. L. BULL., art. 
5, 5-8 (2004).   
71 Aaron L. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on Terror: An American 
Drama, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010).   
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including a newspaper editor who publicly criticized the actions of 
President Lincoln when he took office.72  Professor Scott Sullivan 
writes:  
Lincoln’s execution of the Civil War 
demonstrated little patience with legal niceties that 
could potentially impede his prosecution of the war 
effort.  Some of Lincoln’s most controversial acts 
include unilaterally suspending habeas corpus rights 
in parts of the Confederacy, engaging in military action 
that was unsanctioned by Congress, embracing the 
concept of total war that led to the burning of Atlanta 
by General Sherman’s troops, and ordering a military 
blockade in the absence of congressional 
authorization.73 
The Lincoln Administration, moreover, countenanced both the 
retaliatory killing of innocent civilians and destruction of civilian 
property within the Confederate States.74  Sullivan writes: 
The rights-restricting actions imposed during 
the ongoing war on terror have been much more 
restrained than that of the Civil War.  Unlike Lincoln’s 
broad grants of power to military commanders to 
suspend habeas corpus as they saw fit, there has been 
no suspension of the right of habeas corpus.  The 
detention facilities at the U.S. Naval Station at 
Guantanamo Bay compare quite favorably to the harsh 
treatment and occasional summary execution suffered 
during the Civil War.  Similarly, President Bush has 
received Congressional authorization for each major 
military operation in which his administration 
engaged, despite his clear belief that such assent is 
Constitutionally unnecessary.75 
                                               
72 Id.    
73 Scott Sullivan, International Law and Domestic Legitimacy: Remarks Prepared 
for Lincoln’s Constitutionalism in Time of War: Lessons for the Current War on 
Terror? 12 CHAP. L. REV. 489, 490 (2009); see also CARNAHAN, supra note 67, at 
109. 
74 CARNAHAN, supra note 68, at 60-62. 
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 The political paradigm faced by Lincoln, however, differs 
markedly from that which was presented to Presidents Bush and 
Obama.  Lincoln prosecuted an unequivocal war of necessity to 
preserve the Union and did so at a time when both international law 
and the laws of war were in their infancy.  Robert Fabrikant writes: 
Prior to the Civil War there were no international 
conventions laying out the law of war.  To say that 
international law was in its infancy at that point would 
be an understatement.  There was no accepted legal 
code that embodied international law, including the 
law of war.  European countries had a loose, and 
entirely unenforceable, set of understandings 
extending back millennia to which they resorted in the 
context of resolving commercial, not military, disputes.  
These understandings were referred to as customs and 
usages, but there was no universal agreement as to 
their content or meaning. 
The international law of war was even less 
undeveloped than its commercial counterpart.  The 
legal thinking which existed in this realm came largely, 
perhaps exclusively, in the form of scholarly writings.  
Naturally, these writings conflicted with one another, 
and they had no binding effect.76 
Unlike the Civil War, where international public opinion 
counted for very little, the War on Terror, set in a very different media 
age, was subjected to heightened public scrutiny.  By way of example, 
Congress’ bipartisan 9-11 Commission concluded allegations that the 
United States abused prisoners in its custody “make it harder to build 
the diplomatic, political, and military alliances the government will 
need [for] a successful counterterrorism strategy.”77  According to a 
report by the United States Senate Armed Services Committee,  “[t]he 
                                               
76 Fabrikant, supra note 68, at 388-89 (2009); see also Sullivan, supra note 73, at 
494-95. 
77 Keith A. Petty, Beyond the Court of Public Opinion: Military Commissions and 
the Reputational Pull of Compliance Theory, 42 GEO. J.  INT’L L. 303, 319 (2011) 
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fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates 
our ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our 
enemies, and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save 
lives.”78  In short, United States policymakers have failed to place the 
country “in front” of its international obligations to its overall 
detriment.  This is in marked contrast to the United States 
government’s behavior in Lincoln’s time.  
First, Lincoln successfully rebutted Confederate claims to self-
determination by spearheading a war effort to delegitimize 
slaveholding as an aspect of Southern identity worthy of self-
determination.  Second, it was Lincoln himself who first codified Dr. 
Francis Lieber’s Instruction for the Government of Armies of the 
United States on the Field, originally published as General Orders No. 
100, War Department, Adjutant General’s office - the first ever 
codification of the Laws of War- commonly known as the Lieber 
Code, named after its drafter.79  The Lieber Code was the foundation 
for similar law of war codifications in Prussia, the Netherlands, 
France, Russia, Spain and Great Britain.80  “It was also an important 
influence at the conferences of Brussels in 1874 and at the Hague in 
1899 and 1907” and led to the eventual formulation and adoption of 
the Hague Conventions in 1907, which formalized and circumscribed 
the behavior of belligerents.81  How important was the Lieber Code?  
A half century after the Civil War, in his opening address as President 
of the American Society of International Law, former Secretary of 
State and Nobel Laureate Elihu Root said the following: 
                                               
78 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., Senate Armed Services Inquiry into the 
Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, at xxv (Nov. 20, 2008), available at 
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee% 
20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf. 
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[W]hile the instrument was a practical presentation of 
what the laws and usages of war were, and not a 
technical discussion of what the writer thought they 
ought to be, in all its parts may be discerned an 
instinctive selection of the best and most humane 
practice and an assertion of the control of morals to the 
limit permitted by the dreadful business in which the 
rules were to be applied.82 
The foremost scholar on Lincoln’s actions as Commander-in-
Chief, Burrus M. Carnahan, writes: 
Drafted by an academic intent on drawing 
general principles of human morality from empirical 
evidence, and issued by a President determined to 
found his policies on human reason, the Lieber Code 
may be considered the final product of the eighteenth-
century movement to humanize war through the 
application of reason.  From this standpoint, the Lieber 
Code’s greatest theoretical contribution to the modern 
law of war was its identification of military necessity as 
a general legal principle to limit violence, in the 
absence of any other rule.83  
Because it was signed and approved by President Lincoln, the 
Lieber Code enabled the United States Army to present itself as the 
world leader in respect of army conduct.  No other western army had 
previously limited the conduct of its soldiers on the battlefield like the 
U.S. Army ostensibly did while conducting a war for the nation’s very 
survival.84 
It would be going too far to say that President Lincoln’s 
adoption of the Lieber Code hamstrung the effectiveness of United 
States armies.  Indeed, it has been demonstrated that Civil War 
combatants paid little attention to the Code’s requirements.85  
                                               
82 Meron, supra note 79, at 271 (quoting Elihu Root, Opening Address at the 
Seven Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 
24, 1913), reprinted in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 456 (1913)). 
83 Carnahan, supra note 69, at 213. 
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Moreover, to the extent it was followed, Article 15 of the Code set 
forth that Union forces were to be guided by the Military Necessity 
Doctrine, which, left broad authority to military commanders to 
pursue their objective to preserve the Union.86  The Military Necessity 
Doctrine grants considerable latitude to the military in the face of its 
enemy and even civilians.  It even allows for a quarantining of a 
civilian population and, at times, the collective punishment of civilian 
non-combatants.87  Indeed, its very expansiveness led many to see it 
as little more than a means for providing an ethical justification for a 
Carthaginian-style destruction of the States comprising the 
Confederacy.88  
 However, as Professor Carnahan writes, “recognition of 
military necessity as a legal precondition for destruction represented 
an enlightened advance in the laws of war in the nineteenth 
century.”89  This is because “the law of nations permitted the capture 
or destruction of any and all property belonging to any person owing 
allegiance to an enemy government, whether or not these measures 
were linked to military needs.”90  Indeed, even with respect to the 
overall parlous civilian treatment by Union Armies, Carnahan writes: 
There is a continuing debate over whether the Civil 
War was the first “modern war” or “total war,” the 
precursor of the world wars of the twentieth century.  
Most historians agree, however, that in one crucial 
respect the Civil War differed from total wars of the 
last century.  Except in retaliation for unlawful acts of 
the enemy, the organized armies on both sides did not 
target civilians for deliberate killing.  Inhabitants of the 
Warsaw Ghetto, Nanking, or Tokyo in World War II, 
or Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
surely would gladly have exchanged places with 
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Southern civilians in the path of Hunter, Sherman, or 
Sheridan in 1864.91   
 To Lincoln, the most fundamental limitation on military 
necessity was that it could be invoked only to attain a particular 
military objective and never solely a political one.92  Notwithstanding 
today’s legal suppositions as to self-determination, he was guided 
solely by his goal of preserving the Union in a manner that evidenced, 
to a degree, solicitude and respect for the rule of law under the United 
States Constitution.93  Lincoln, however, was governed by objectives 
outside of mere military necessity and the “fundamental distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants was maintained throughout 
the war.”94  By way of example, by proposing that special 
consideration be given to private homes, Lincoln adumbrated the 
1907 Hague Regulations on land warfare, the 1907 Convention on 
naval bombardment, and Protocol Additional I to the Geneva 
Conventions that all prohibit any attack on undefended dwellings.  
Included within the doctrine of military necessity was the need to 
take measures to ensure public order and safety.95  This foreshadowed 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations that “declared the obligation of 
an occupying commander to ‘take all the measures in his power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.’”96 
 Lincoln’s prosecution of the war was enhanced not only by the 
necessity of prosecuting what clearly was a civil war for the nation’s 
survival, but by his placing the U.S. out front of its international 
obligations by promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation, 
which effectively rebutted the Southern claim of self-determination 
and his adoption of the Lieber Code. This careful positioning of the 
                                               
91 CARNAHAN, supra note 68, at 109. 
92 Carnahan, supra note 69, at 219. 
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94 Id. at 228. 
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U.S. with respect to international law and international public opinion 
is a lesson that has largely been lost by today’s U.S.leaders.  
  
X.  THE CURRENT WAR ON TERROR AND LINCOLN 
 
 Unlike Lincoln who if anything, waged a war of absolute 
necessity to insure the continued survival of the Union, the Bush 
Administration chose to wage an absolute “war of choice” against 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  Not only was the Iraq War an unjustifiable 
response to the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks, but it was carelessly 
and illegally executed after its supposed justification was rejected by 
the United Nations Security Council.97 This diverted resources from 
the then-nascent Afghanistan occupation, cost thousands of lives, 
much treasure and complicated Iraq’s eventual transition to a stable 
democracy. 
 Although the Obama Administration was warmly received by 
the international community – to the point where the forty-fourth 
President was prematurely and embarrassingly awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize during his first year in office – its continued use of 
Predator Drones to kill suspected terrorists, regardless of  civilian 
casualties, and its failure to close the detention facility in Guantanamo 
Bay has compromised the effectiveness of its strategy in Afghanistan 
and worsened already problematic relations with a nuclear armed 
and unstable Pakistan.  These failures have harmed the Obama 
Administration’s strategic imperative, which is to engender 
international cooperation from our allies to share the costs of ensuring 
international peace and relocate the focus of American foreign and 
security policy from the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan 
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region toward the dynamic Asia Pacific Region.98  This is necessitated 
by a decline in relative American power, the need to engage an 
increasingly powerful and assertive China and ensure an established 
American presence in the world’s fastest growing economic region.  
Due largely to the perception of American unilateralism and 
lawlessness though, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have 
been unable to fully engage the international community to deal with 
matters of obvious global concern.99  Sullivan writes: 
 In the war on terror, international law, and 
especially international humanitarian law, has played a 
crucial role in providing the previously established 
standards in the most fevered debates over detention 
policy and accepted means of interrogation.  The 
primacy of international law in these realms is 
somewhat surprising given the American 
predisposition to dismiss the importance of 
international law generally.  In spite of this general 
attitude to such law, I believe that international law has 
acted as a cornerstone here in gauging the legitimacy 
of state action as a general matter.  This is due to the 
greater incorporation into a rights-oriented regime 
affecting traditionally domestic concerns combined 
with (1) its place as an external benchmark of executive 
action; and (2) the absence of domestically embedded 
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rules and standards acting contrary to the thrust of 
international law.100 
The consequences of United States policymakers’ failure to 
recognize this as well as the importance of global public opinion have 
been severe.  By way of example, the Obama Administration has been 
unable to obtain United Nations Security Council’s cooperation to 
deal with the present humanitarian catastrophe in the Syrian Arab 
Republic.101  The Administration’s proposed sanctions against Bashar 
al-Assad’s Alawite regime were vetoed by two Security Council 
Permanent Members, the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China.102  Recognizing these states have interests 
completely separate from those of the United States, including a 
strategic interest in reasserting a non-interventionist paradigm, both 
countries were able to veto the proposed measure with a impunity 
due to the international community’s increased skepticism as to 
American motives.  This, of course, provides no comfort to the Syrian 
people and their advocates, who must turn increasingly to an 
assertive Republic of Turkey to potentially fulfill the United Nations’ 
Responsibility to Protect.103 
 Similarly, the United States, by any international standard, 
was entitled to protect itself by killing the Al-Qaeda leadership, 
including Osama bin Laden, who was killed by a United States Navy 
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Seal Team on May 2, 2011, while at his compound in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan, situated close to the Pakistan Military Academy.  Although 
the Obama Administration deserves credit for risking its prestige to 
kill him, the fact Bin Laden was comfortably housed in Pakistan near 
a prominent military academy raises the very troubling question of 
how Pakistani political culture views its United States backer and aid 
donor.104 
 The Eurozone Debt Crisis is another case in point.  To date, the 
United States has spent at least $2 trillion on the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.105  This expense stands in marked contrast with United 
States Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s April 2012 refusal to 
donate any money to the International Monetary Fund’s request for 
emergency funds to deal with the Eurozone debt crisis.  It is, to this 
writer, evidence of the United States government’s failure that it 
continues to spend large sums in an area that is tangentially related to 
American prosperity and security, while at the same time refusing to 
spend any money on a problem that is central to this objective.  As the 
Financial Times’ Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Gideon 
Rachman recently wrote, the United States' unwillingness to address 
the Eurozone debt crisis is due to a lack of available resources and a 
collapse in American prestige and influence.  He writes: 
So what has changed?  A lack of money is a 
large part of the problem.  America spent the 
equivalent of 5 per cent of its gross domestic product 
on the Marshall Plan.  That is not feasible now.  Tim 
Geithner, the US Treasury secretary, frequently urges 
his European colleagues to do much more to solve the 
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debt crisis.  But, while he can speak softly, he is not 
carrying a big cheque book.  
However, American leadership has not always 
relied on cash.  The “committee to save the world” did 
not spend a huge amount of money.  But it was 
operating in a different period.  Less than a decade 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union – and with the 
American economy booming – US policymakers had 
the credibility and the confidence to lead.  In large part, 
that is lacking today.  The financial crisis has taken its 
toll on America’s ability to persuade, as well as on its 
finances.106 
 To this, I would add the War on Terror.  
  The current United States predicament is well-stated by 
Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who, in an address to the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, said the following: 
The Constitution always matters, perhaps particularly 
so in times of emergency. . . .  Security needs may well 
matter, playing a major role in determining just where 
the proper constitutional balance lies. It is this proper 
constitutional balance of both civil liberties and 
national security that our three co-equal branches of 
government have worked rigorously to attain amidst 
the current wartime climate.107 
Breyer, however, fails to take account of the international 
perspective.  Like it or not, America’s War on Terror requires a broad 
level of international legitimacy and support that cannot succeed if 
based on domestic concerns alone.  Accordingly, although use of 
military commissions to try alleged terrorists is constitutional and 
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may be the only option available to the Obama administration in view 
of domestic politics, it works against the United States' interest in 
engendering global cooperation and assistance in the War on Terror. 
 The Honorable Frank Williams, Chief Justice of the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court states the following, the facts of which are 
incontrovertible: 
Criticism surrounding the Bush administration’s 
decisions about how to safeguard the United States 
seems to these writers to be particularly ill-founded 
when one considers that the President’s actions pale in 
comparison to actions taken by prior presidents, such 
as Abraham Lincoln, who, despite his widespread 
suspension of habeas corpus, is still ranked among the 
nation’s greatest leaders.  Lincoln’s actions, although 
radical, were necessary during the Civil War, as now, 
when grave national security problems were 
pandemic. 
Almost 150 years later, the Bush administration, 
like Lincoln, is faced with yet another grave national 
emergency that requires unpopular decisions.108 
 Correct as Judge Williams may be, his analysis partly misses 
the point.  President Lincoln’s war against the Confederacy was not 
only a war of necessity, but one that involved solely domestic actors.  
It was, after all, a civil war.  Second, the war was conducted before the 
development of international jurisprudence regarding the conduct of 
armies on the battlefield and, to the extent that such requirements 
were extant, President Lincoln placed the United States Army “in 
front” of the issue by his adoption of the Lieber Code and its military 
necessity doctrine.  None of these factors apply to the Bush and 
Obama administrations.  Although the Bush  administration had 
strong international support for the initial invasion of Afghanistan, 
the support for United States presence in Afghanistan has dissipated 
due to both the length of the endeavor and a perception that the 
United States public, its politicians and military pay insufficient 
                                               
108 Id. at 680-81 (footnotes omitted). 
WAR ON TERROR – LESSONS FROM LINCOLN    45 
  
attention to both the needs and safety of Afghan civilians, who are 
increasingly caught between the corruption and incompetence of the 
Karzai government and the brutality and viciousness of the Taliban 
insurgents.  Perhaps equally important, United States legitimacy in 
the “War on Terror” was undermined by the largely unilateral 
invasion of Iraq against the will of the international community.  
Although the Saddam Hussein regime was almost unique in its 
barbarity, the United States claim of pre-emption was viewed as 
incredible by both United States allies and the international 
community.  The United States’ subsequent failure to ensure the 
safety of Iraqi civilians after the invasion cost it further international 
legitimacy and support.  Perhaps most significantly, the Bush and 
Obama administrations’ focus in waging the “War on Terror” has 
been based solely on domestic political legitimacy when the 
endeavor’s success requires greater international support and 
cooperation.   
Andrew Kent writes, “the clear trend in the Court and legal 
academy is globalist—viewing the reach of the Constitution’s 
protection of individuals as unaffected by geography, citizenship or 
hostility to the United States and construing the document as if it 
were an international human rights instrument.”109  Indeed, these are 
requirements of an increasingly active global political culture and 
civil society.  This heightened scrutiny did not restrict the U.S. Army 
during Lincoln’s time, but it does today.  The United States' failure to 
recognize this fact accounts in large measure for the decline in its 
geopolitical position. 
 
XI.  CAUTIONARY ASPECTS TO LINCOLN’S LEGACY 
 
 This is not to say that Lincoln’s legacy is unblemished.  Far 
from it.  Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief needlessly countenanced 
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actions by Union troops that delegitimized the Union war effort and 
made his eventual goal of reintegrating the Confederacy into the 
Union more difficult.  By way of example, Lincoln’s unauthorized 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus greatly and perhaps 
needlessly delegitimized the Union war effort.   
 Although Lincoln adopted the Lieber Code and required the 
U.S. Army to abide by the military necessity doctrine, this still left 
ample room for abuse of Southern civilians to the overall detriment of 
both Southerners and the United States government, which sought to 
subsequently reintegrate the Confederate States into the Union.  The 
Lieber Code’s military necessity doctrine countenanced the starving 
of the enemy, whether armed or unarmed, in order to effectuate its 
speedier subjugation.110  It also allowed Union forces to both drive 
civilians back into a besieged city that is short of provisions, so as to 
hasten surrender and, if necessary, deny quarter when one’s 
“salvation makes it impossible to cumber” oneself with prisoners.111  
Notwithstanding the Lieber Code’s application, the U.S. Army 
ensured that Southern civilians and infrastructure paid a heavy price 
for the Confederate rebellion against the Union. Southern cities were 
besieged and burned, and civilian life and property were often 
disregarded.112 
 Moreover, Lincoln’s critics note that his claim to have acted to 
free the slaves is belied by his failure to enunciate the Emancipation 
Proclamation until this was necessitated by Congressional radical 
Republicans and only after the continued support of Union 
slaveholding States became less critical.113  As William Klingaman 
points out, the President's decision to issue the emancipation 
proclamation “was a gamble born of desperation and frustration from 
repeated military failures.”114  Indeed, at the outset of his presidency, 
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“Lincoln supported a constitutional amendment barring the federal 
government from touching slavery in states where it already 
existed.”115  Perhaps this was little more than acknowledgment of 
both a political and strategic reality.  That said, the fact Lincoln 
countenanced slavery in Border States such as Kentucky, Delaware, 
Missouri and Maryland and refused to emancipate slaves in certain 
conquered portions of the Confederacy, contrary to the requirements 
of the Lieber Code, has propitiated the claim, heard in the South to 
this day, that the Civil War had more to do with “northern 
aggression” than slavery.  This has permitted a siege mentality to 
thrive as part of Southern identity that has hindered a more complete 
integration of African Americans with Southern Whites.  These 
problematic aspects to Lincoln’s legacy evidence how difficult the 
United States' current predicament is, especially since its eventual 
success will require winning not only the battle for global public 
opinion, but sufficient “hearts and minds” within the Islamic world to 
delegitimize and neuter anti-civilizational Muslim radicals such as Al-
Qaeda.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The United States' national interest in this globalized, post-
financial crisis world is to remediate many long-neglected domestic 
problems, including a faltering education system, unemployment, 
stagnant wages, income inequality, and falling international 
competitiveness.  To a degree, these challenges cannot feasibly be 
addressed so long as the United States continues to bear almost the 
entire cost of maintaining international peace and security.  Its allies 
will be less likely to share these costs if the United States is seen as 
unilateral, aggressive and indifferent to ensuring international human 
rights.  American actions in both Iraq and Afghanistan largely 
perceived as negligent and without regard for civilian welfare, have 
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harmed its international reputation and hindered cooperation from 
United States allies and strategic partners.  As a consequence, the 
United States now finds it more difficult to obtain international 
assistance in its goal of peaceable disengagement from the Middle 
East and South Asia.  Although the brutality of the Civil War has been 
unsurpassed in United States history, Lincoln’s actions as 
Commander-in-Chief were undertaken to fulfill the compelling 
interest of preserving the Union before either global public opinion or 
international law became relevant to the war’s legitimacy.  Indeed, to 
the extent international standards were relevant, President Lincoln 
shrewdly placed the United States ahead of the curve by taking a 
strong stand against slavery and by his adoption of the Lieber Code to 
govern the conduct of U.S. armies in the field.  That said, the 
viciousness of the war effort, while it facilitated the United States' 
immediate goal of restoring the Union, worked against the long-term 
goal of ensuring a stable rapprochement between North and South.  
 It is a complicated predicament.  While the United States must 
protect its citizens and territory from terrorist attacks, it cannot do so 
in a manner that alienates world public opinion and engenders 
antipathy.  These were lessons well understood by United States 
leaders from both major political parties during the twentieth century, 
when United States actions corresponded with an interest in ensuring 
international stability, free markets and democratization.  Examples 
include the United States' actions as the leading democracy against 
the Axis Powers during World War II, aid to Greece and Turkey and 
the Marshall Plan in the immediate post-war aftermath, its key 
support for the nascent European Coal and Steel Community that 
developed into today’s European Union, its support for 
democratization and open markets in South Korea and Japan, the 
opening to China that led to several hundred million Chinese being 
freed from poverty, its actions as the leading democracy in opposition 
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War and its critical intervention 
on behalf of German unification at the Cold War’s end.  The key to 
United States success in the twentieth century was not only the 
country’s unmatched economic and military might, but the 
preponderant international perception that United States interests 
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corresponded with a more open and prosperous world.  It remains in 
the United States' interest to see a more stable and prosperous world, 
albeit one in which the costs of global security are shared more 
equitably by emerging and mature powers that have a stake in world 
stability.  The challenge for United States policymakers is to ensure 
United States policies reflect these interests.  
 
